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Abstract 
Persistent tensions between the international norm of state sovereignty and emerging human rights 
norms including the responsibility to protect and the protection of civilians during international 
peacekeeping raise the question of when and under what circumstances local and regional actors are 
more likely to respect global norms. These tensions are particularly stark in Africa. On the one hand, 
African states and regional organization were among the first proponents of liberal protection norms 
in the non-Western world. On the other hand, many African leaders view state sovereignty as 
indispensable. Building on established empirical justice research in neighboring fields, this paper 
makes an important contribution to the literature by demonstrating that African states are more 
likely to accept interventionist human rights norms when standards of procedural justice have been 
observed. The article demonstrates the relevance of procedural justice by examining the puzzle of 
divergent African reactions to two similar instances of regime change in Libya and the Ivory Coast 
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In lieu of an introduction: The fall of two potentates and the puzzle of Africa’s divergent 
reactions to the application of emerging global norms 
In the early hours of 20 October 2011, NATO aircraft detected and attacked a convoy fleeing from 
the besieged city of Sirte, Libya. One car carried Libya’s long-time leader Muammar el-Qaddafi. 
Colonel Qaddafi survived the airstrike and sought shelter in a drainpipe. Upon his discovery by rebels, 
he was tortured and executed. His corpse was displayed publicly in a freezer in the town of Misurata 
(Human Rights Watch 2012). This gruesome event temporarily ended a conflict that had started in 
mid-February between rebels under the umbrella of a National Transitional Council and forces loyal 
to the Colonel. When Qaddafi’s troops gained the upper hand, leading the international community 
to fear the imminent fall of the rebel stronghold in Benghazi and mass atrocities, the UN Security 
2 
 
Council (UNSC) on 17 March issued Resolution 1973 authorizing all necessary means to enforce a no-
fly zone and to protect civilians in danger. The resolution alluded to the emerging Responsibility-to-
Protect norm (R2P) and is widely held to be the first case of R2P application. Officially, intervening 
states claimed that their use of force was restricted to pursuing the two legally sanctioned aims of 
enforcing a no-fly zone and protecting civilians. However, the actual employment of military force led 
most African and international observers to conclude that regime change was the true aim (Global 
Centre for the Responsibility-to-Protect, 2012: 12f.). 
163 days earlier, another Head of State in Africa experienced a less violent, yet similarly coerced 
overthrow. On 9 April, French helicopters and UN-troops opened fire on President Laurant Gbagbo’s 
residence in Abidjan, the Ivorian capital. After the first salvos had driven most of the remaining 
presidential guards from the compound, French tanks enabled opposition forces to enter the 
President’s hideout. Gbagbo was dragged from his bunker, paraded in front of the international 
press, and eventually handed over to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Prior to Gbagbo’s 
capture, French forces of Operation Licorne and UN-troops of the United Nations Operation in Cote 
d’Ivoire (UNOCI) militarily decided a power struggle between forces loyal to the acting President and 
those of his challenger, Alassane Ouattara, that the 2010 presidential elections had triggered. UN and 
French troops intervened on the basis of UNSC resolution 1975, which had been adopted on 30 
March 2011, just 13 days after resolution 1973. Although international bodies had noted Gbagbo’s 
electoral defeat, resolution 1975 ordered UNOCI to act impartially. The resolution authorized the 
UN-force “to use of all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent 
threat (…).” The resolution thus invoked a related emerging norm that calls for the Protection of 
Civilians (POC) in peace-keeping operations.1 France and the UN insisted that military operations 
conformed strictly to the UNSC’s mandate. Major Fréderic Daguillon, a French military spokesman, 
even claimed that the French tanks deployed on the morning of 9 April were responding solely to 
attacks on civilians. "We deployed along the strategic axis. One of these was a road that led to the 
residence of Mr. Gbagbo.” (The Guardian, 2011) 
Again, few commentators in Africa and beyond believed that the ouster of Gbago was an accident or 
an unfortunate by-product of the primary aim of protecting civilians. Yet, the reactions in Africa to 
the two events differed fundamentally. The African Union (AU) and many African states, principally 
South Africa, denounced Western actions in Libya as a betrayal of the UN, an abuse of the mandate, 
and even as an outright act of neo-colonialism. After the intervention, the AU and African states 
strayed from the R2P norm and refused to back Western draft resolutions in the UNSC demanding an 
end to the mass atrocities in Syria. In contrast, African reactions to the intervention in the Ivory Coast 
were mostly favorable, in some capitals rather restrained, but almost nowhere hostile. Moreover, 
after the intervention, African regional organizations and states continued to support the POC norm 
and the UN’s leading role in implementing it in Africa.  
Why did the majority of states in Africa denounce the forced removal of Qaddafi from power in 
pursuance of the R2P norm? And why did they accept or even support the forced removal of Gbagbo 
in pursuance of the related POC norm? The divergence of their responses to similar applications of 
related norms is a puzzle and the subject of this article. I resolve this puzzle by arguing that African 
leaders accepted regime change in the Ivory Coast but rejected it as illegitimate in Libya because they 
had been fully involved in the process of applying the protection norm in the first case but had been 
                                                          
1 For overlaps and differences between the R2P and the POC norm, see Breakey (2012). 
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excluded in the second case. Though interesting in itself, this puzzle also suggests a larger research 
program that would examine the influence of procedural justice on the likelihood that local and 
regional actors comply with emerging, liberal norms. This paper makes a significant contribution by 
assessing the application of two important norms in the crucial region of Africa. 
The relevance of Africa’s mounting critique of R2P for the future of global governance can hardly be 
understated. Africa was the first non-Western region to embrace R2P. Given the skepticism in other 
regions, including a “right (…) to intervene in a Member State (…) in respect of grave circumstances 
(war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity)” in Article 4(h) of the AU’s Constitutive Act, 
adopted on 11 July 2000 and thus even before the release of the path-breaking report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, seemed to indicate that core liberal 
global governance norms would also flourish in non-Western parts of the world. Africa’s stinging R2P 
critique following the intervention in Libya was interpreted as a historical breach. It appeared not 
only to herald the end of R2P (Rieff, 2011), but also to foreshadow organized resistance from non-
Western regions against principles of liberal order. This impression was reinforced by similar 
developments in international criminal justice. Here too, African states and organizations were 
among the first proponents of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the underlying norm of 
holding individuals accountability for mass crimes in the non-Western world, and their support was 
crucial to the adoption of the Rome Statute. Yet, early applications of said norm – most importantly 
the warrant for Sudanese President Al Bashir, prompted the AU to question its support for the ICC 
and catalyzed the search for an African version of international criminal justice (Magliveras and Naldi 
2013). Given these setbacks, the Ivorian case provides rare encouragement for proponents of global 
norms and accentuates the puzzle concerning disparate African reactions to applications of global 
norms. 
Existing research on local reactions to emerging global norms mainly applies norm diffusion theories. 
Two main strands of these theories would resolve this puzzle by pointing to the “fit” between the 
R2P and POC norms and pre-existing African traditions and interests that purportedly favor regime 
security over human security. According to this argument the AU’s early support of R2P was tactical 
and never anticipated that acting heads-of-state would be charged for crimes committed in their 
names. In contrast, including the obligation in peacekeeping mandates to protect civilians requires 
the approval of the target state, and is ostensibly less regime threatening as a result, thus 
conforming to the interests of African states. Accordingly, early applications emphasized differences 
in interpretation between African and Western actors and resulted in the deterioration of R2P and 
the specification of the POC norm. Other explanations would emphasize case-specific factors, like 
differences in the leaders’ standings relative to their peers  or differences in the conflict situations 
that might affect the appropriateness of regime change. In the concluding section, I examine both 
explanations and find that neither accounts for the disparate African reactions. 
Against these general and case specific explanations, this paper emphasizes one decisive cause of 
contestation that obtains in both cases: the independent effect of procedural fairness on the 
acceptability of distributive decisions based on emerging norms. The impact of decision-making in 
“accordance with generally accepted principles of right process” (Franck 1990: 24) on the legitimacy 
and resultant acceptability of rules and institutions has been widely discussed in political science and 
international law. Thomas Franck emphasizes four properties of rules (determinacy, coherence, 
symbolic validation and adherence) that influence the compliance pull of international law. Scholars 
of international law and International Relations in the constructivist tradition stress the importance 
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of common understanding and deliberative interaction that allow actors to challenge and verify 
validity claims and seek consensus about the justification and application of the norms guiding their 
behavior (Risse 2000: 7; Kratochwil 1989). As I will demonstrate below, empirical justice theory 
addresses both procedural properties and interaction between authorities and those affected by 
decisions that allows the latter to verify the appropriateness of decisions. However, in contrast to 
Franck, justice theory puts more stress on relational issues like e.g. the recognition of affected actors 
by authorities. In contrast to the above mentioned constructivist approaches, justice theory pays less 
attention to normative and foundational issues like the possibilities of inter-subjective understanding 
and is rather driven by empirical observations of human conduct. In other words, justice theory 
departs from this research by providing a motivational theory that explains why actors insist on just 
treatment and how they react to acts of procedural injustice. 
Justice is one of the most over-used words in international public diplomacy. Virtually every keynote 
speech or UN-debate on global order refers to justice. Yet IR scholars, still influenced by Thomas 
Hobbes’s verdict about justice being inapplicable to inter-state relations (Hobbes, 1994 [1651]: 97), 
tend to dismiss such references as empty talk. Although justice as a normative concept has become 
prominent in the sub-discipline of international political theory, it has rarely been studied empirically 
as a motivation for political actors.2 This neglect contrasts markedly with the prominence that 
empirical justice research has gained in neighboring disciplines, like social psychology. Most 
important in the current context is the relationship between the two dimensions of distributional 
and procedural justice, which suggests three arguments. First, regional organizations and states of 
the “Global South” will insist on procedural rights as a condition for accepting global norms like R2P 
and POC. Second, the actual granting of procedural rights in the run-up to decisions on the 
application of those norms autonomously affects how states perceive the fairness of these decisions 
and may also affect acceptance of the norm-set in question. Third, decision-makers react to the 
denial of procedural rights with behavior familiar to socio-psychological studies: rage, stubbornness 
and other kinds of “non-rational” behavior.  
The article proceeds as follows: the next section will summarize empirical justice research in 
neighboring fields, arguing that the study of International Relations would benefit from incorporating 
this research. More specifically, it will show how justice approaches can contribute to debates on 
global governance. The chapter will conclude by providing a hypothetical explanation of the puzzle 
based on justice and norm diffusion theories. Sections three and four examine processes of African 
norm appropriation and reactions to early norm applications. The concluding chapter will assess 
alternative explanations in light of the findings presented from both cases and draw lessons for the 
future of global governance. 
What explains local reactions to global norms: Institutional justice versus normative fit 
Toward a theory of institutional justice 
In contrast to justice as a normative concept that has occupied political theorists since Plato and 
Aristotle, empirical justice research focuses on the justice claims of real-world actors. Empirical 
justice research began to flourish in the 1960s as a sub-field of social psychology (Tyler, 2012; Jost 
                                                          
2There are some exceptions. Albin and Druckman (2012) demonstrate that justice is important for the success 
of international negotiations. David Welch found that justice claims drive conflict (Welch, 1993). See also 
Druckman and Müller (2014). 
5 
 
and Kay, 2010: 1123) and is now firmly established in the social sciences, for example in 
organizational theory (Greenberg and Colquitt, 2008; Konovsky, 2000), experimental economics 
(Binmore 2005), sociology (Jost and Kay, 2010), social neuroscience (Singer, 2007; Singer et al., 2006), 
criminology, and anthropology (Boehm 2001). This fledging research program took wing with John S. 
Adams’s (1965) groundbreaking work on equity theory, which showed that the justice motive works 
independently of interests. Through numerous experiments and field studies since that study, 
empirical justice research has demonstrated that justice considerations are significant for intra-group 
interaction. Judgments about what is just or deserved profoundly influence people’s behaviour and 
their interaction with others, including authorities (Tyler and Smith, 1998: 595). Experimental 
research shows that justice judgments are linked to pro-social behaviour, such as willingness to 
contribute voluntarily to the flourishing of social groups (Fehr and Gächter, 2002), and that 
experiences of injustice trigger anti-social behaviours, like theft or sabotage (Sigmund et al., 2002: 
84; Nowak et al., 2000).  
In examining the role of justice concerns, empirical justice research holds two different dimensions of 
justice to be significant: distributive and procedural justice. Distributive justice refers to standards 
that determine how material and immaterial goods ought to be shared. Procedural justice is 
conceptualized as the fairness of processes that lead to distributive decisions. More precisely, 
procedural justice pertains to processes that guide the application of general distributive rules in 
concrete situations, which are usually controlled by authorities. Both dimensions are interrelated in 
that weaknesses in one dimension may be compensated by strength in the other.  
The importance of procedures and how they affect the acceptability of distributive outcomes can be 
illustrated with reference to litigations, which was the object of research of two pioneering scholars 
in this field, social psychologist John Thibaut and lawyer Laurens Walker. They assume that actors do 
not question the law (established rules) as such but might perceive the ruling (application of 
established rules) by courts (authorities) in concrete cases as fair or unfair. Actors will more likely 
accept even those verdicts as fair that do not conform to their initial expectations, provided the 
procedures were fair. If, on the other hand, they feel that the procedures are structurally biased 
against them, they will likely start to question the established judicial system, though not necessarily 
the law as such. Actors might value procedural justice even more highly than distributive justice 
because the latter is difficult to assess, but the former admits inferences about distributive fairness. 
Concerning causal mechanisms, procedural justice theory does not assume that procedures influence 
the acceptability of outcomes because they change preferences – judicial deliberations may alter the 
views of the persons involved or not – but because the process itself is fair. Thibaut and Walker 
(1975: 546) emphasize process control and disputants’ voice opportunities as core aspects of 
procedural justice. Process control provides crucial information about the correctness of the process. 
Others, like Gerald Leventhal (1980), argue that the fairness of decision-making processes depends 
on several properties, like consistency of application, impartiality of decision-making bodies, and the 
accuracy of information flowing into the procedure.In brief, actors are more likely to accept even 
decisions that do not conform to their initial expectations if they feel that the decision-making 
process allowed input, if authorities have not taken advantage of them and if they have been treated 
with respect. 
As to why justice is so important for actors, empirical justice research has generated both an interest-
based and an identity-based model. The first assumes self-interested actors who depend on social 
interaction to achieve gains. According to this model, "justice is important because it ‘regularizes’ 
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social interaction" (Tyler and Smith, 1998: 612). A second model, advanced by Allan Lind and Tom 
Tyler (1988), is based on social identity theories. Their group value model assumes that procedures 
within groups reflect relations of status, power, and authority. Actors assess their standing within a 
group depending on how other members of the group, especially authorities, treat them. When 
applied empirically, conceptual differences between the two models quickly blur. In brief, both 
models suggest that the human sense for justice serves social functions: it facilitates the distribution 
of yields from common endeavours, allows actors to find their place in hierarchies, and fosters the 
acceptance of authorities. Thus, research asserts that justice conceptions have co-evolved with 
practices of social cooperation. Justice is a co-constitutive element of stable social interactions and 
community-building. 
These findings have been established by analyzing the behaviour of individuals in small groups. This 
begs the question whether they can be applied to the analysis of relations between large groups or 
states. Recent research indicates that they can. First, empirical studies in social psychology indicate 
that individuals identify with groups and want to see their group treated fairly in inter-group 
relations. Studies on relative deprivation, for example, show that individuals, even if they are not 
affected, protest if they perceive their social group to have been disadvantaged (Tyler and Smith, 
1998: 605, 610). Second, recent research in International Relations has found that social dispositions 
and experiences on the individual level have repercussions for state behaviour. This has been 
demonstrated, for example, with respect to emotions (Mercer, 2010, 2013), humiliation (Saurette, 
2006), and disrespect (Wolf, 2011). Two causal chains may explain this transfer. First, state leaders 
and foreign policy elites may perceive the international system as a social order and  be guided by 
their perception of what is just within this social order when formulating foreign policies. Second, the 
assumption above that members of large politically organized groups or states identify with those 
states may lead to shared conceptions of justice that should guide the relations of their states with 
others.  
This review reveals ample and hard evidence that justice claims matter in social relations. Of course, 
the global world is still a state-centric system, and many of its norms and rules are still emerging. 
Justice claims, even those about the rights of individuals, will thus mainly be formulated on the level 
of inter-state relations, and justice conceptions will be less demanding and less definitive than in 
domestic discourse. Yet, the contemporary international system is characterized by increasing 
interdependency, externalities, hierarchies and authority, and increasingly resembles a social order 
(Hobson and Sharman 2005). It would be surprising if justice considerations were relevant for 
cooperative endeavours in most social contexts, but not internationally. 
To show where justice theories converge and diverge from existing research on global governance, 
the next section will summarize central assumptions of norm diffusion theories and specify how 
norm diffusion and justice theories frame and resolve the puzzle. 
Contributions of norm diffusion and justice theories to debates on global governance 
Early research on norms in IR focused on how norms emerged internationally, diffused, were 
accepted by an increasing number of actors, and were institutionalized in the form of international 
conventions and law (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Noting that norms’ meanings often remain 
contested even after many states subscribe to them, recent research has criticized this linear 
conception (Badescu and Weiss, 2010), arguing instead that norms, even after they have become 
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institutionalized, still “tend to be vague” (Krook and True, 2012: 104), remain a “work in progress” 
(Betts and Orchard, 2014: 2), and can be stable as well as dynamic (Wiener, 2007). One obvious 
reason for this indeterminacy is the abstract character of norms. Norms provide general guidance but 
can never cover every contingency. They are characterized by ‘zones of uncertainty’, since it often 
remains unclear “exactly what changes in behavior will be required to meet international 
commitments” (Victor et al., 1998: xi). Lingering differences over the meaning of norms are likely to 
emerge in the first applications (Sandholtz, 2008: 101). This ‘zone of uncertainty’ problem as well as 
the importance of early applications are familiar to both institutional justice theories and norm 
diffusion theories. Disputed are the structural causes that explain why seemingly accepted standards 
become contested after early applications. 
Norm diffusion theories emphasize structural cleavages that appear when norms travel across 
cultural and historical contexts. Two strands of this research are relevant here. Socialization theories 
propose that pioneers set standards that less advanced actors will emulate (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). Sociological institutionalism stresses structures, most importantly world cultural systems, as 
determinants that induce institutional isomorphism across regions (Meyer, Boli, Thomas and Ramirez 
1997). In contrast to functional theories, sociological institutionalism assumes that isomorphic 
change is not task-driven or efficiency-oriented and, thus, often leads the formal adoption of 
institutions to decouple from daily practices (Schofer, Hironaka, Frank and Longhofer 2012: 60)  In 
contrast, most versions of this strand in International Relations qualify assumptions about quasi-
automatic diffusion and instead emphasize the importance of agents of socialization and various 
socialization mechanisms, like strategic calculation, role-playing, and suasion (Checkel, 2005). They, 
too, expect gaps in these adoption processes and consider the fit between emerging global norms 
and pre-existing local practices as the most important factor for successful socialization. In contrast, 
localization theories emphasize the autonomy of local actors and their ability to react creatively and 
strategically to global normative pressure. Depending on how global norms relate to ‘cognitive priors’ 
(Acharya, 2004), i.e. preexisting traditions, habits and interests (of state elites), target states will 
reject, accept, or prune them according to their needs. Though the two strands start from different 
perspectives, they agree on one central point. Unqualified acceptance is improbable. Instead, local 
actors, based on their local cultural background knowledge, interpret international norms differently. 
While localization theories assume that norms will be ‘pruned’ to fit existing local traditions and 
practices, socialization theories expect that strategic adjustment and role-playing is more likely than 
internalization. Both theories, therefore, perceive conflicts over application as indicators of 
theretofore hidden differences regarding the meanings of norms. 
Applied to the African position toward R2P, both strands would argue that the negative reaction to 
the norm’s early application in Libya revealed differences in the interpretation of what R2P actually 
entails. These differences would have pertained in particular to whether R2P can legitimize an 
international use of force against incumbent governments that fail to meet their obligation to 
protect. Applied to POC, norm diffusion theories would argue that the fit between the global 
understanding of the norm and local traditions and interests was better and, accordingly, that initial 
applications of the norm led to a mutual determination of its meaning.  
The reasoning of justice theory, too, departs from the ‘zone of uncertainty’ problem. Uncertainty 
arises because norms are not self-enforcing, often including mechanisms or procedural annexes 
stipulating how and by whom they are to be applied in concrete situations. Procedures become more 
important when the uncertainty zone is wide and norms have profound implications. R2P and POC 
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are cases in point. As I will show, both are exceedingly under-specified yet involve possibly severe 
risks, as they penetrate the protective cloak of sovereignty and imply a potentially dramatic re-
distribution of adjustment costs, risks, and obligations. R2P and POC procedures are controlled by 
two groups of actors: states that command superior institutional resources, especially the permanent 
members of the UNSC, and states with the resources to implement decisions, that is, ‘coalitions of 
the willing’ in the case of R2P and troop-contributing countries in the case of POC. From this point of 
view, uncertainty pertains to whether distributive decisions taken by authorities like the UNSC are 
fair and appropriate interpretations of the norm or reflect ulterior motives. An example might clarify 
this point. Observers agree that R2P is not consistently applied but differ on why. Jennifer Welsh 
argues that “inconsistency is built into the very fabric of R2P (…)” According to her, inconsistency is 
necessary because each crisis is different (Welsh, 2014: 137). Hence, what might appear as a double-
standard actually results from attempts to apply a norm consistently across different cases. Others 
posit that inconsistency results from distorted decision-making processes. The P-5 simply do not 
honor their commitment under Art. 24.1 of the UN Charter to act on behalf of the world community 
and instead pursue narrow national interests (Hehir, 2011: 18). The zone of uncertainty problem, 
according to this analysis, consists of the difficulty actors have determining whether the norm’s 
application reflects case-specific peculiarities and is thus fair or represents double-standards and 
ulterior motives of the decision-making authorities.  
This analysis leads to three hypotheses: 
(a) Actors care about procedures. African states’ support for the R2P and POC norms is conditional on 
the fairness of the procedures regulating their application in Africa. 
(b) Procedures have an autonomous effect on actors’ inclinations to accept distributive decisions. In 
the current cases this implies that, prior to both crises, African positions toward R2P and POC were 
neither settled nor very different from those of many Western countries. According to this 
interpretation, procedural voice opportunities were denied during the Libyan crisis, and this 
experience of injustice caused the African critique of the outcome and ultimately of the R2P norm-
set as a whole. This argument also implies the counterfactual that, if voice opportunities had been 
granted, the AU would have accepted deposing Qaddafi. With regard to POC, justice theory holds 
that the fairness of procedures during the Ivorian crisis induced Africans to accept the outcome and 
support a more robust interpretation of POC. The counterfactual to this narrative is that, had 
procedural rights been denied, African states and regional organizations would not have accepted 
deposing Gbagbo and would have been more critical of POC.  
(c) States react with pro-social behavior when treated fairly and with non-social behavior when 
treated unfairly. Pro-social behavior, such as committing to uphold a shared norm, is more difficult to 
detect. However, we should be able to observe non-social behaviors, such as stinging criticism and 
disengagement, of African actors in reaction to unjust treatment in the Libyan case. I will not 
systematically test this third argument, but I do present anecdotal evidence. 
As mentioned above, justice theory suggests that the fairness of procedures could be improved by 
granting those subject to global rules a voice in their application and by ensuring that authorities 
observe fairness criteria when applying rules (e.g. consistency and impartiality). Both dimensions are 
relevant in international relations. For example, the current policy debate on reforming global 
governance architecture revolves around two proposals: a thorough overhaul of the Security Council 
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and increased say for regional security organizations (United Nations 2015a). As Security Council 
reform remains stalled, the second dimension gains prominence. Thus, for the rest of this paper, 
procedural justice is understood as granting affected states and regional organizations voice 
opportunities in the application of global norms to the extent that these actors claim such 
opportunities. Forms of institutionalized voice opportunities in the application of global norms may 
range from (a) a right to prior consultation; (b) shared ad hoc arrangements (e.g. joint peace 
operations like UNAMID in Darfur) and (c) regional implementation mechanisms (e.g. EURATOM’s 
nuclear material accounting and control system that dovetails with IAEA controls in EU states) to (d) 
granting regional organizations the legal right to veto Security Council decisions.  
In the following sections, I investigate the reactions of the African Union and African states to both 
protection norms. I focus on South Africa, since Pretoria strongly influenced the AU’s diplomatic 
activities in both crises.  
The African Union and the Responsibility to Protect 
The concept of an international responsibility to protect individuals against genocide, war crimes or 
crimes against humanity quickly gained traction after the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty published its report in 2001. The world community welcomed this emerging 
norm, as many commentators have characterized it, at the 2005 World Summit, yet its contours 
remained indistinct. A vague consensus emerged prior to Libya that R2P entails a layered system of 
responsibilities of (a) states to protect their citizens, (b) the international community to assist them, 
and (c) the international community to intervene if states manifestly fail. Further, international 
consensus coalesced around the principle that military force be used only as a last resort. The World 
Summit also specified R2P’s procedures by confirming the UNSC’s authority to authorize coercive 
measures without, however, answering questions that had already been raised by the ICISS, such as 
what to do in cases of capricious Council inaction.  
As mentioned above, the AU incorporated the idea of R2P in its Constitutive Act as early as July 2000. 
Article 4(h) of this document grants the Union the right to intervene in serious crises in a member 
state. This suggested that the establishment of the AU in 2001 to succeed the discredited 
Organization for African Unity (OAU) heralded a normative shift from a culture of non-intervention to 
one of non-indifference (Williams, 2007). It appeared that African states were not only accepting 
Western norms, but that R2P in particular was a “norm born out of Africa” (Williams, 2009: 397). 
The AU’s acknowledgement of R2P was surprising. Many African states are fragile, ruled by 
authoritarian regimes and can quickly become sites of serious conflict and targets of humanitarian 
intervention. Consequently, article 4(h) was much debated during the founding of the AU, and a 
number of states remain skeptical of the principle. This normative shift only occurred due to the 
shock of the Rwandan genocide and the entrepreneurship of countries like South Africa and Nigeria 
(Tieku, 2004). To make the R2P more palatable, they appealed to existing ideas of pan-Africanism 
and traditional expectations of solidarity with oppressed fellow Africans (Adebajo, 2010: 417; 
Dembinski and Schott, 2014: 371-74; Williams, 2011: 155). Nevertheless, the AU remained divided. 
Prior to the crisis in Libya, three positions had arisen: South Africa, Nigeria, Rwanda and Ghana 
supported R2P; the Arabic states in North Africa along with Zimbabwe opposed it; and the rest 
positioned themselves somewhere between these two poles (Williams, 2009: 414f). In practice, 
African implementation of R2P remained inconsistent after 2005, and the AU oscillated between the 
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principles of non-indifference and non-intervention. Although their reaction to the crisis in Darfur 
reflected a new sensibility toward abuses of power by states, it also revealed reservations about 
acting against incumbent governments (Kieh, 2013). Even states that staunchly supported R2P were 
reticent about the norm’s practical consequences. South Africa is a case in point. As previously 
mentioned South Africa was one of the most instrumental norm entrepreneurs and played a pivotal 
role in anchoring R2P in the AU’s Constitutive Act (Landsberg, 2010: 441). Yet, in line with its concept 
of Pax South Africana, Pretoria preferred a strategy of engagement, quiet diplomacy, and 
compromise. It also viewed “military intervention as being at the far side of a spectrum of coercive 
measures (…) to be taken only after other instruments had been exhausted.” (Landsberg, 2010: 446; 
see also Mabera and Dunne, 2013; Verhoeven et al., 2014). Critics in South Africa have denounced 
this approach for fostering regime security instead of human security (Aboagye, 2012). Yet before 
Libya, neither the AU nor the majority of African states questioned the appropriateness of R2P or 
rejected for principled reasons a robust interpretation of this norm. The South African last resort 
doctrine, shared by the AU, signified not principled opposition against using force in R2P contexts but 
was intended to reduce tensions between R2P and the African preference for preventing and 
resolving conflicts peacefully. Moreover, Africa’s approach to R2P conformed to many Western 
countries’ understanding of the norm.  
R2P’s African proponents, however, made their assent dependent on one central condition. They 
insisted that the AU would decide on the exercise of the norm in Africa, rather than the international 
community or the UNSC. Article 4(h) explicitly arrogated the right of intervention to the AU. The 
Ezulwini Consensus from 2005, on the basis of which the AU prepared its position for the World 
Summit, reinforced support for R2P but also insisted that only regional organizations decide on 
interventions in their respective regions. (African Union 2005: 6). This insistence on ‘voice’ was 
meant neither to prohibit interventions by extra-continental powers nor to legally challenge UN 
prerogatives.3 Rather, these stipulations were intended to give Africans control over the activities of 
extra-continental powers.  
This attempt to establish R2P and to use procedural mechanisms to minimize the risk of exploitation 
was tested during the Libyan crisis. As violence on the part of the Libyan government against its 
populace escalated in February 2011, the AU aligned with the international community. When 
announcing its first official position on 23 February, the AU sharply criticized the actions of the Libyan 
government (African Union, 2011a). As the conflict approached armed confrontation between the 
Qaddafi regime and the opposition in Benghazi, the AU drafted a road map for resolving the crisis 
during a follow-up meeting on 10 March. This document rejected foreign military intervention and 
instead called for urgent African action to end hostilities immediately, to protect civilians and to 
implement political reforms. To prime negotiations between the conflicting parties, the AU 
assembled a high-ranking ad hoc group to travel to Libya (African Union, 2011b). The three African 
countries with a seat on the UNSC, South Africa, Nigeria and Gabon, supported Resolution 1970 
without reservation. After initial hesitation, South Africa decided to also support Resolution 1973 on 
17 March 2011, thereby ensuring a majority for the resolution, since the other two African members 
followed Pretoria’s lead (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014: 904). Up to this point, the African states and 
the AU shared the international consensus to implement R2P in Libya, if necessary by using force 
                                                          
3 In recent decisions the AU Peace and Security Council acknowledged the primacy of the UNSC in matters of 
security but stressed that the relationship between the UN and the AU should be a guided by a ‘flexible and 
innovative application of the principle of subsidiarity’ (African Union, 2012b). 
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gradually and as a means to enforce a compromise. This approach apparently conformed to the 
views of the Western initiators of Resolution 1973 as well. The latter even approved a passage in 
paragraph 2 of resolution 1973 explicitly mentioning the planned dispatch of an AU delegation to 
Libya with the goal of resolving the crisis. 
Accord between the AU and the initiators of Resolution 1973 deteriorated into strife as soon as the 
first coalition bombs fell on 19 March 2011. The coalition of willing states closed Libyan airspace, 
thereby blocking the AU’s mission. Once this ad hoc group was finally able to enter the country in 
April 2011, it became clear that their pleas for negotiation did not fail on account of opposition from 
Qaddafi, but instead due to the National Transitional Council in Benghazi. According to the ad hoc 
group’s interpretation, the aerial war had consolidated the rebels’ dismissive position. The 
Transitional Council had gained military high ground and now hoped to win the conflict militarily. The 
clearer it became that the coalition's intervention would lead to forced regime change, the more the 
AU distanced itself from the coalition and became disenchanted with the R2P principle it had 
previously supported.  
Reactions to the intervention in Libya by African states reinforced existing differences. While Nigeria 
and Rwanda seemed to understand the coalition’s actions somewhat (Kagame, 2011), rejection was 
pronounced in countries such as South Africa and Uganda. However, similar splits were observed 
among EU member-states. More important were the similarities in Africa. A large majority of AU 
member states agreed that African rights had simply been ignored and that their efforts to find a 
peaceful solution were undermined through the coalition’s actions. Moreover, although the issue of 
heads-of-state’s immunity played a role (Omorogbe, 2012), many African leaders suggested that 
Qaddafi would have to step down (De Waal 2013: 370). Even Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni 
stressed the right of the Libyan opposition to resist, criticizing merely the interference by extra-
continental actors. South Africa’s position is of particular interest. Why Pretoria made the last minute 
decision in favor of 1973 remains controversial. However, sources close to South African decision-
makers claim that Pretoria knew the resolution would trigger the use of force but reckoned that (a) 
military measures would be used to protect civilians and improve the likelihood of a diplomatic 
solution4 and (b) that Qaddafi’s demission would have to be part of this solution (McKaiser, 2011).  
The root of the conflict was in how Resolution 1973 was implemented, and how this served to 
marginalize the AU. With their right of participation and control ignored, and the AU’s efforts 
undermined, African actors reacted harshly and defiantly, as statements by leading AU 
representatives and countries such as South Africa attest. This reinforces the significance of the 
justice motive and the awareness of unjust treatment. 
African leaders’ statements clearly illustrate that they resented what they perceived as unfair 
treatment of African states by the coalition members. AU chairman Jean Ping condemned the 
coalition’s actions as adverse to the peace process and accused coalition members of having a hidden 
power agenda (BBC News, 2011). Just before the end of the conflict, he criticized double-standards in 
the West's treatment of covert military assistance (Tull and Lacher, 2012: 9). Museveni (2011) argued 
that “Western countries always use double standards. Their actions […] are emphasizing that might is 
right”. South African presidents Zuma and Mbeki charged that the states with the power to bomb 
                                                          
4 See the statement of South Africa’s Ambassador to the UN, Mr. Sangqu, justifying the vote in favor of 1973, 
UN Security Council, 6498th Meeting, S/PV. 6498, New York 17 March 2011, p. 9f. 
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deliberately undermined African peace efforts; they used their advantageous position to abuse 
Resolution 1973 and to marginalize the AU (Mail and Guardian Online, 2011a, 2011b). In a speech 
before the UNSC, Zuma argued that it was “the view of the AU that the 1973 Resolution […] was 
largely abused in some specific respects” (de Waal, 2013: 367). Further, he stated that what 
informed the treatment of African states was not the unbiased interpretation of a general principle 
but the idea of “might is right” (Mbeki, 2011). The South African President not only criticized the 
coalition’s lack of respect for international law but particularly the violation of the African right to 
self-determination. In his view, arbitrary and unfair treatment was so pronounced in the case of Libya 
that he claimed it set a “very dangerous precedent”, rhetorically asking “which African country will 
be next?” (Mbeki, 2011). A similar critique appeared in a public statement signed by over 200 African 
intellectuals, stating that the UNSC had allowed a coalition of powerful and willing states to usurp 
Resolution 1973 and undermine the AU’s roadmap. Thus, the UNSC had supported “the immensely 
pernicious process of the international marginalisation of Africa even with regard to the resolution of 
the problems of the Continent” (Open letter by “concerned Africans”, 2011). During the letter’s 
formal introduction, one of its initiators, Johannesburg Professor Chris Landsberg, warned that “the 
re-colonisation of Africa is becoming a real threat.” (Global Research, 2011) 
Perceptions of unfair treatment also led to defiant policies by the AU and African states. As a first 
expression of its frustration, the AU boycotted the Paris Summit on 19 March and the London 
Conference on 29 March 2011, where the Libya Contact Group was established, thereby sacrificing 
the opportunity for further influence (de Waal, 2013: 371). Escalating further, on 1 July the AU 
recommended that its member states ignore the international arrest warrant for Qaddafi (The New 
York Times, 2011). The AU defiantly refused to recognize the National Transitional Council as 
representing Libya until Qaddafi’s death on 20 October 2011. The AU and South Africa’s seeming 
irrationality baffled observers, who characterized their behavior as “stubborn” and “obstinate” (Tull 
and Lacher, 2012: 8f). Others noted that the ANC leadership “fumed” when NATO special forces 
appeared on the ground and that Pretoria felt “betrayed” (Verhoeven et al., 2014: 525f.). 
Following Libya, the AU and African states reassessed the risks of R2P (Zähringer, 2013). This 
distancing manifested in South Africa’s position toward the crisis in Syria. In 2011 and 2012 Pretoria 
abstained on two of three Western-sponsored UNSC resolutions (S/20111/612 and S/2012/538) and 
voted in favor only of S/2012/77, which explicitly ruled out the use of force. While deliberating UN 
Draft Resolution S/2011/612 in October 2011, which condemned the use of force by the Syrian 
government, South Africa did not reject R2P but argued that Resolution 1973 had previously been 
abused (United Nations, 2011a: 10f.). In UN debates, South Africa defended the notion of R2P but 
insisted on fair procedures that would curtail the discretion of intervening states.5 This approach was 
mirrored by representatives of other African states, who demanded that either regional 
organizations’ procedural rights be strengthened or that the AU reviews its stance toward R2P 
(Hofmann, 2015: 296). 
                                                          








To summarize, case specific evidence does not allow a final verdict in the controversy whether the 
African leader’s objections to the Western approach in Libya were based on disagreement over the 
meaning of R2P or on a perceived violation of procedural fairness. Yet, it indicates that crucial African 
states, such as South Africa, did not principally opposed the use of force but tried to balance 
different norms and the crosscurrent demands of protecting civilians and solving conflicts peacefully. 
Only the marginalization of the AU clearly changed the African position and fuelled criticism and 
anger in Pretoria and elsewhere. More important are insights from the comparison of the 
interventions in Libya and the Ivory Coast described below. They lend credence to the counterfactual 
argument that the AU might have accepted a forced regime change, if the AU has a say in the 
implementation of resolution 1973 and, if the AU’s mediation efforts failed, raising the specter of an 
unlimited war.  
The African Union and the protection of civilians during peacekeeping missions 
Since the late 1990s POC has become a “core obligation” of UN peacekeeping (United Nations, 2015: 
11). The UN developed this concept in response to the increasing multi-dimensionality of 
peacekeeping missions as well as to the shift away from state-centric security and toward the 
principle of human security. The UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999 was the 
first with an explicit mandate to protect civilians. Since then, most UN missions have operated with a 
POC mandate. Still, the UN has yet to clarify what POC implies in practice and how it relates to the 
traditional core principles of peacekeeping: consent of the conflicting parties, impartiality, and non-
use of force except for self-defense.  
At first glance, POC seems more palatable to African states than R2P because, as a mandated 
obligation, it is based on the consent of local governments and is consequently less regime-
threatening. Closer inspection indicates, however, that this norm also provides a potential gateway 
to intervention by extra-continental actors. Since the Brahimi Report of 2000, UN documents have 
argued that more robust rules of engagement and a flexible interpretation of the core principles 
would be needed to effectively protect civilians. Accordingly, consent does not empower conflicting 
parties to manipulate the implementation of the mandate, nor does impartiality imply that all 
conflicting parties be treated equally; rather, it means that force may be used both for self-defense 
and to fulfill the mandate (Holt et al., 2009). The Capstone Doctrine of 2008 called POC the “core 
business“ of peacekeeping, and the 2009 UN “New Horizons” document emphasized both the 
robustness of peacekeeping missions and the significance of protecting citizens (Dembinski and 
Schott, 2014). Here, the UN further decouples the military measures it is responsible for from the 
consent of local governments. The HIPPO-Review of peacekeeping operations states that “Missions 
should protect civilians irrespective of the origin of the threat” (United Nations, 2015: 46.) Similar to 
the R2P logic, recent UN documents recognize the primary responsibility of the state to protect 
civilians but also a responsibility of the UN mission to step in:  
“However, in cases where the government is unable or unwilling to fulfill its 
responsibility, Security Council mandates give missions the authority of act 
independently to protect civilians. Bearing in mind that missions operate within the 
principles of peacekeeping and in accordance with the mandate, missions are 
authorized to use force against any party, including elements of government forces, 
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where such elements are themselves engaged in physical violence against civilians” 
(United Nations OCHA/DPKO, 2011: 3).6  
Although African decision-makers were aware of the risks,7 the AU backed the POC norm early and 
even drafted African POC guidelines in 2010, which envisage more robust engagement than UN 
documents. While a series of other AU missions were also meant to protect civilians in one way or 
another, the AU explicitly tasked the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with this goal. The protection of 
civilians is also the priority in operational plans for the AU’s intervention force (ASF) (Dembinski and 
Schott, 2014: 287).  
Similar to the African appropriation of R2P, African states and the AU accepted POC provided they 
could control its application. Since the late 1990s, the AU has pursued two strategies to secure voice 
opportunities. The first foresaw the creation of a robust African Standby Force (ASF) of 20 000 troops 
that would provide African solutions to African problems. However, those plans quickly proved 
beyond African means, and the AU settled for a more limited capacity for temporary missions that 
could be quickly transferred to the UN or would allow the AU to assume an active part in UN 
operations (Coleman, 2011). However, the AU is willing to work with and rely on the UN only if the 
UN grants Africans a say on the implementation of robust peace-keeping and POC. In a report on the 
peacekeeping partnership between the AU and the UN, the AU urged that the UNSC “should give due 
consideration to the decisions of the AU and its PSC [Peace and Security Council] in arriving at its own 
decisions” (African Union, 2012b). Cooperation between global and regional organizations is to be 
informed by a new interpretation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter as well as by principles including 
respect for African ownership and priority setting (African Union, 2013). In sum, the AU will accept 
robust peacekeeping missions in Africa only if extra-continental actors commit to consulting closely 
with African bodies and considering their concerns and interests when implementing the missions, 
even if African actors themselves can offer only few resources. 
This expectation was tested during the Ivorian crisis. In autumn 2010, the country finally conducted 
overdue presidential elections. The vote was meant to re-integrate a nation that had been de facto 
divided as a result of civil war in 2002. The elections pitted Laurant Gbagbo, who had served as 
president since October 2000 and represented the communities and elites of the South, against his 
long-time challenger Ouattara, who represented various armed groups and political movements from 
the North. The second, decisive round of internationally monitored elections took place on 28 
November 2010. Four days later, the Electoral Commission declared Ouattara as the new president 
with 54.1% of the vote. The following day, however, the President of the Constitutional Council and 
Gbagbo ally, Paul Yao N’dre, citing irregularities and fraud, invalidated 600 000 ballots from districts 
in the North and declared Gbagbo the winner. 
The ensuing international diplomatic attempts to solve the crisis involved the UN, the AU, and the 
sub-regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Authorized by UNSC-Resolution 
1765 of 16 July 2007 to certify future elections, the Special Representative of the Secretary General, 
Young-Jin Choi, confirmed the count of the Electoral Commission (Hara and Yabi, 2013: 164). 
ECOWAS concurred and, at its meeting on 7 December, suspended Ivorian membership (ECOWAS, 
2010). On 9 December, the AU followed suit (African Union, 2010b). 
                                                          
6 The 2015 HIPPO report also refers to this R2P logic (see United Nations, 2015b: 37). 
7 Sudanese President Bashir, for example, opposed the deployment of a UN mission to Darfur, fearing that it 
would curtail government-sponsored operations in the region (Franke, 2009: 120). 
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When Gbagbo balked and escalated the conflict by mobilizing militias and armed youth against 
Ouattara supporters, the seemingly united international front cracked. ECOWAS sent mixed signals. 
At its meeting on 24 December, it imposed sanctions and even told Gbagbo “to stand down or expect 
to face ‘legitimate force’” (BBC News, 2015). This tough rhetoric, however, hardly hid that some 
members, worrying about the safety of their citizens in Cote d’Ivoire, were reluctant to use force and 
that ECOWAS’ standby force was operationally unable to intervene (Institute for Security Studies 
2011: 10). In the UNSC, Russia and others expressed reservations regarding Choi’s early and public 
commitment in favor of Ouattara (Hara and Yabi, 2013: 64). Nevertheless, confronted with 
worsening violence, on 19 January the UNSC authorized 2000 additional troops for UNOCI. As to 
ways out of the crisis, however, the Council remained silent until March 2011. 
At this point, the AU took center stage. The continental organization preferred a power-sharing 
agreement. This approach was advocated mainly by South Africa. President Zuma and his 
predecessor, Thabo Mbeki, were partial to Gbagbo. To explore a potential compromise, the AU 
dispatched Kenya’s Prime Minister Odinga, himself a member of a power-sharing government. 
Odinga’s mission failed. Gbagbo refused to meet after Odinga had criticized him sharply and insisted 
that the election results be recognized. After this setback, Zuma became personally involved. On 28 
January 2011, the PSC charged a high-level panel, comprised of the heads-of-state of Chad, 
Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Tanzania and South Africa, to find a way out of the crisis. The dispatch of a 
South African naval vessel into international waters off Ivorian Coast was obviously a signal to Nigeria 
to stand-down and wait for the AU to conclude its mission, and it underlined Pretoria’s eagerness to 
find a solution. Zuma and his counterparts began the mission hoping for some kind of power-sharing 
agreement to result. During the mission, however, they had to acknowledge three points. First, Zuma 
realized that the Constitutional Commission’s case was not credible (Hara and Yabi, 2013: 167). 
Consequently, the panel’s report, released on 10 March, did not call for a recount and instead 
confirmed Ouattara as the legitimate president. This implied that Ouattara would have to lead any 
power-sharing government. Second, Zuma and the other members of delegation eventually realized 
that Gbagbo would not accept a power-sharing agreement that favored his contender. In his ‘after-
action’ report, the chairman of the Commission on the Situation in Cote d’Ivoire summarized the 
negotiations. According to his account, the panel requested Gbagbo cede power and accept a 
“National Union and Reconciliation Government” (African Union 2011c). The end game of the 
negotiations evolved during a PSC meeting in Addis Ababa on 10 March, to which both contenders 
had been invited. While Ouattara had travelled to Addis and accepted the AU proposal, Gbagbo 
refrained. His representative, Pascal Affi N’Guessan, rejected the proposed solution. Third, Zuma and 
the other heads of state recognized that time for a peaceful solution was running out. This was 
clearly articulated by the PSC at its meeting on 10 March, where it warned that security situation was 
rapidly deteriorating to a point where Cote d’Ivoire would “sink into widespread violence”. Given this 
prospect, the PSC continued to search for a compromise that would “reconcile respect for democracy 
and the quest for peace”, but otherwise confirmed the findings of the panel report and recognized 
Ouattara as president (African Union, 2011b). This was widely seen as evidence that the AU’s search 
for a negotiated solution had failed and that it was time to revert to the UN. In New York, the 
diplomatic process accelerated quickly. By 25 March, France and Nigeria circulated a critical draft for 
Resolution 1975. On 4 April, Ban Ki Moon instructed UNOCI to use all necessary means to prevent the 
use of heavy weapons against civilian populations, while French and UN helicopters started 
coordinated attacks that eventually ousted Gbagbo. 
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Two conclusions from this episode are particularly noteworthy. First, although the African Union 
preferred the installation of a power-sharing government, it finally accepted the ouster of Gbagbo. 
The ‘after action’ report of the chairman of the Commission on the Situation in Cote d’Ivoire noted 
the AU’s active role in the resolution of the crisis. The AU “should welcome this development “(…) 
and “fully play its rightful role in consolidating peace in Cote d’Ivoire” (African Union, 2011c 4f.). To 
the extent that procedural fairness allowed AU members to determine that UN-authorities and extra-
continental powers were neither biased nor behaving incorrectly, that the decision-makers’ 
information was accurate, and that the AU’s preferred solution was failing, procedural fairness 
arguably explains the AU’s acceptance of an outcome that deviated from its preferred solution.  
Second, while this episode reinforced many African rulers’ worries that the POC norm is no less risky 
than R2P, the AU and other African organizations and states redoubled their support for POC. Two 
developments confirm the impression that this protection norm is developing in the interstice 
between the global and the regional levels. First, the AU continues to recognize the concept and has 
deepened its cooperation with the UN. AU peace missions deployed after 2011, like the AFISMA 
mission in Mali, have been routinely equipped with a POC mandate. Second, African states and 
organizations acclaimed the progress toward more robust UN-peacekeeping by accepting a crucial 
precedent: the deployment of a new UN intervention brigade, a heavily armed combat force, in the 
Eastern part of the DR Congo (Cammaert, 2013). Therefore, it is evident that regional participation 
and involvement are vital to the regional acceptance of robust peacekeeping missions carried out by 
extra-continental actors in Africa. 
Summary and implications for political practice 
By way of conclusion, I will assess possible solutions to the puzzle and discuss what implications 
these findings might have for the broader global governance debate. I will begin with two sets of 
alternative explanations: case-specific and those derived from norm diffusion theories. One case-
specific explanation focuses on both leaders’ standing among their African peers. According to this 
explanation, Qaddafi, the self-declared African ‘King of Kings’ and financial supporter of many African 
regimes and organizations like the AU, was well respected and his ouster attracted sharper criticism 
than Gbagbo’s (St John, 2003; Chhiba, 2011). This explanation clearly fails. Qaddafi indeed financed 
many regimes in Africa, but he also meddled constantly in the internal affairs of other states and 
financed vicious rebel groups. Due to this constant meddling and his abrasive diplomatic style, 
Qaddafi’s African peers feared and loathed him more than they respected him (Beresford 2015: 292). 
By contrast, Gbabo had built a reputation as an African socialist who dared to stand up to French 
neo-colonialism. He also enjoyed the amity of many nationalist leaders, like Angola’s President dos 
Santos (Hara and Yabi, 2013: 165).  
The second case-specific explanation holds that, due to the strong African norm against 
unconstitutional changes of government, it was deemed to be more appropriate to depose the loser 
of an election than a leader guilty of atrocities against his own population in the midst of civil war. 
Originally conceived as a regional rule-set for regime protection against  coups d’états, African states 
have also developed rules against ignoring the outcomes of democratic elections. However, 
established procedures for regional reactions to such unconstitutional behavior by no means 
envisage forced regime change. Instead, African regional organizations usually react by orchestrating 
a compromise (Witt 2012). Thus, South Africa’s initial response to the Ivorian crisis adhered to 
established practices, and the ouster of Gbagbo was considered inappropriate. 
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With regard to norm diffusion theories, observation falsifies their core assumption that, prior to 
2011, African and Western understandings of R2P and POC differed significantly. Both groups of 
states understood military intervention as a last resort. Moreover, the Gbagbo case refutes the 
presumption that Africans hold heads of state to be sacrosanct and always value regime security 
above human security. 
However, both cases confirm the expectations of justice theory. African states and regional 
organizations initially accepted both emergent global norms conditional on the right to procedural 
co-determination. This condition for the acceptance of both norms was tested in 2011. During the 
Libyan crisis, the AU’s demand for voice was denied. Thereafter, the AU criticized the 
implementation of UN Resolution 1973 as an act of neo-colonialism, acted stubbornly, and began to 
question established rules of application, though not necessarily the norm itself. In the Ivorian case, 
the AU was fully involved. Although the outcome deviated from the AU’s preference, the 
organization and its leading states accepted the ouster of Gbagbo, conduced to post-crisis 
reconstruction, and continued to support the POC norm. Both cases are similar enough to serve as 
each other’s counterfactuals and thus allow causal inferences. Combined, they demonstrate that the 
AU reacted with frustration and anger to the Libya intervention because procedural justice had been 
denied and reacted pro-socially to the intervention in the Ivory Coast because the demands of 
procedural justice had been fulfilled.  
If corroborated by further research, these findings will have far-reaching policy implication. Any 
reform of the international order and its norms that redistributes obligations and restricts states’ 
freedom of action will only be accepted if it reflects shared principles of distributional and, even 
more importantly, procedural fairness. In fact, many conflicts that seem to concern the meaning of 
norms in global governance actually concern procedural rights. As long as comprehensive UNSC 
reform to ensure procedural fairness is pending, this principally implies that affected local states and 
regional actors have a say in the application of global norms. The growth of regional security 
organizations reflects local actors’ insistence on co-determination. Thus, devolving responsibility to 
the regional level is an opportunity rather than a risk for realizing global governance. The 
regionalization of global governance architecture, which participants of the founding conference of 
the UN in San Francisco already called for in 1944, is more pertinent than ever. 
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